

Social Psychology of Prejudice:

*Historical and
Contemporary Issues*

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Values and Prejudice

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The very act of affirming our way of life often leads us to the brink of prejudice . . . one must first overestimate the things one loves before one can underestimate the contraries (Allport, 1954, pp. 24-25).

The notion that personal values may lead to the rejection of outgroups has been an enduring and prominent feature not only in Allport's (1954) classic formulation of prejudice, but in many contemporary theories of racism as well (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Katz & Hass, 1988; Katz, Wackenhut & Hass, 1986; Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay & Hough, 1976). In general, these theories assume that the world is interpreted in terms of one's own values such that value violating outgroups are disliked—even perceived as contemptible.

However, the direct impact of values on prejudice has only been examined in limited ways and typically in the context of attitudes toward Black Americans. The purpose of this chapter is to elaborate on the relationship between values and prejudice. Towards that end, we examine whether and how values are implicated in prejudice toward a variety of outgroups and toward individual members of those groups. In our approach, we consider a number of value-relevant factors that may contribute to prejudiced reactions toward outgroup members, including individual differences in value endorsement and situational "activation" of important values.

We begin with a review of how values have been conceptualized in the psychological literature and a consideration of major classes of values. We then turn to the literature suggesting that values operate in a hierarchy that flows from values to attitudes to behaviors. Highlighted next is our own research on how the value-prejudice link is mediated by stereotypic content: To the extent that a group is stereotyped as violating an important value, prejudice toward that group and individual group members will increase with individual differences in and situational activation of that value. Although attitudes have typically been considered *the* indispensable construct in social psychology (Allport, 1935), an overarching theme of this chapter is that values—because of their centrality in human thought and behavior—may be even more deserving of that title (Rokeach, 1968).

Value Conceptualizations

Values have been conceptualized in a variety of ways, though several

common themes emerge across definitions. First, values typically refer to those beliefs or orientations that differentiate one individual from others. For example, values have been defined as "conceptions of the desirable" (e.g., Kluckhohn, 1951), general life orientations (e.g., Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961), broad preferences for philosophically different ways of life (Morris, 1956) or as personality types per se (Allport, Vernon, & Lindzey, 1960). In these definitions, values are described as self-defining beliefs.

Others have noted that values are articulations of one's personal goals and standards. Whether viewed as utilities (e.g., Becker & McClintock, 1967) or standards or criteria of conduct (e.g., Williams, 1968, 1979), values are believed to "determine which types of activity have a positive and which have a negative valence" (Lewin, 1951, p. 41). Values are the yardsticks against which both the self and others are judged (e.g., Feather, 1990, 1996; Katz & Hass, 1988; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). Milton Rokeach, the psychologist who has probably had the most impact on the study of values, defined them as abstract concepts . . . "representing a person's beliefs about ideal modes of conduct and ideal terminal goals" (Rokeach, 1968, p. 124): "Once a value is internalized, it becomes, consciously or unconsciously, a standard or criterion for guiding action, for developing and maintaining attitudes toward relevant objects and situations, for justifying one's own and other's actions and attitudes, for morally judging self and others, and for comparing self with others" (Rokeach, 1968, p. 160).

Rokeach's definition, as well as the definitions of most others, also importantly stress the broad and enduring nature of values. Values are broad in that a) they may function as general attitudes (McGuire, 1969) that are related to an array of relatively more specific attitude objects and behaviors, and b) they are applicable across situations; they are "trans-situational goals" (Schwartz, 1992). In a social cognitive framework, values have been thought of as superordinate constructs in associative networks beneath which a host of related attitudes and behaviors are arrayed. Values give rise to specific attitudes and behaviors, defining appropriate courses of action in light of one's personal goals and/or desired end-states.

A number of researchers have attempted to map the value domain by developing models and systems (or simply lists) of the values commonly or consensually held by individuals within and across cultures. Thus, we have Rokeach's 18 terminal and 18 instrumental values, and Schwartz's 56 values that fall into 10 "motivationally distinct" value types, ultimately arraying themselves on two key dimensions (openness to change/conservatism and self-enhancement/self-transcendence; Schwartz, 1996, p. 2). A number of other perspectives also focus on a core two-value structure, alternately labelled Harmony versus Security (Braithwaite, 1997), Individualism versus Communalism (Feldman & Zaller, 1992), or

Meritocracy versus Equality (Fletcher & Chalmers, 1991).

Consistent with the notion that values are associatively linked to related attitudes, there is considerable evidence that individual differences in endorsement of particular values do indeed predict attitudes and behaviors in theoretically meaningful ways. Support for values reflecting individualism predicts anti-welfare attitudes whereas support for communalistic values predicts pro-welfare attitudes (Feldman & Zaller, 1992; MacDonald, 1972). Valuing equality over freedom predicts support for the civil rights movement (Rokeach, 1973). Valuing "a comfortable life" over "equality" predicts opposition to higher taxes to help the poor (Tetlock, 1986). Support for "security values" (respect for authority, individualism) as opposed to "harmony" values (equality, concern for others) is associated with conservative attitudes on crime control and job opportunities for women, and with voting for right-wing political candidates (Braithwaite, 1997). Valuing "equality" over "meritocracy" predicts pro-affirmative action attitudes in both Canada and the U.S. (Fletcher & Chalmers, 1991; Sniderman, Tetlock, Carmines, & Peterson, 1993). Valuing power predicts non-cooperation in laboratory games (Schwartz, 1996), and in studies of school-age children, valuing "honesty" is associated with less cheating behavior, especially in older children (Henshel, 1971). This set of findings is selective and incomplete, but it illustrates the kinds of relationships that have been examined in the literature and highlights the fact that individual differences in value endorsement predict important differences in related attitudes and behaviors.

Further documenting the connection between values and attitudes, other researchers have provided evidence that making particular values salient, or linking attitudes to relevant value orientations, produces a number of interesting effects. For example, Rokeach's (1973) classic work on the "value confrontation" technique documented that attitudes and behaviors will shift if inconsistencies in value hierarchies are highlighted. Individuals confronted with the fact that they ranked "freedom" as a more important value than "equality" (thereby indicating that they "are more interested in their own freedom than they are in freedom for other people", p. 454) not only changed their later value rankings but expressed more favorable pro-civil rights attitudes and were more likely to donate money to the NAACP than were those whose values were not confronted or questioned. Furthermore, the attitudinal and behavioral change *followed* the value shift, suggesting that values are broader, higher-order constructs than attitudes and behaviors.

In a similar vein, other research has also indicated that emphasizing certain values over others can change the attitudes people express. In one study, attitudes toward affirmative action shifted when participants who had initially indicated their attitudes were then reminded of an opposing value orientation (e.g., when those who initially said they were anti-

affirmative action were reminded of equality values, Fletcher & Chalmers, 1991). Drawing the connections between values and attitudes may also make individuals resistant to attitude change attempts (e.g., Ostrom & Brock's 1969 "value bonding technique"), and increase consistency among attitudes (Lavine, Thomsen, & Gonzales, 1997).

Taken together, these findings are consistent with the conception of values as broad, superordinate constructs in associative networks, beneath which related attitudes and behaviors are arrayed. Furthermore, these findings suggest that two core values may be particularly important to understanding a wide range of attitudinal responses: Individualistic values—belief in the Protestant Ethic and meritocracy, and communalism/egalitarianism. This latter theme becomes even more apparent in theory and research on values and prejudice.

The Values-Prejudice Link

As noted earlier, the notion that one's personal values may lead to the rejection of outgroups has been prominent in many contemporary theories of White Americans' antipathy toward Black Americans. For example, the theory of "modern" or "symbolic" racism suggests that racism is largely based on Whites' perceptions that Blacks violate cherished values of "individualism and self-reliance, the work ethic, obedience, and discipline" (Kinder & Sears, 1981, p. 416; see also McConahay & Hough, 1976). Symbolic racism is further described as "a blend of antiblack affect and the kind of traditional values embodied in the Protestant Ethic" (Kinder & Sears, 1981, p. 416).

In the "ambivalent racism" perspective (Katz, Wackenhut & Hass, 1986; Katz & Hass, 1988), Whites are assumed to possess both pro- and anti-Black attitudes, each derived from a different value base: Anti-Black attitudes are based on Protestant Work Ethic (PWE) values, and pro-Black attitudes on Humanitarian/Egalitarian (HE) values. Values also figure prominently in the theory of "aversive racism" (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), which distinguishes aversive racists from blatant racists by postulating that the former have egalitarian self-images and are thus motivated to behave favorably toward Blacks in situations where normative contexts cue this value.

Although these theoretical perspectives differ in a number of important ways, a common theme is that two core values are important to understanding prejudice: Egalitarian values (or communal values), which seem to put the brakes on prejudice, and PWE or individualism values, which seem to promote prejudice. In addition to supporting the link between prejudice and *individual differences* in endorsement of these values, these theories of racism also suggest that *situational manipulations* of value salience influence Whites' attitudes toward Blacks. For example, Katz and Hass (1988) have found that priming of PWE values leads to increased endorsement of anti-black attitudes, while priming of egalitarian values enhances endorsement of pro-Black attitudes.

However, the implications of this individual difference/situationalist perspective on the value-prejudice link have not been fully explored. First, the targets of prejudice in this research have typically been African Americans. But if values are superordinate constructs in associative networks beneath which a host of related attitudes are arrayed, then PWE and egalitarian values might be associated not only with anti-Black sentiment but with prejudice toward a variety of groups. And viewed from the reverse perspective, prejudice toward a given group may also be associated with any number of different values. Second, the reasons why PWE and egalitarian values are tied to prejudice against African Americans, or why any given value might be related to prejudice toward a particular group, have not been developed into a full theoretical model.

To help rectify these matters, we have proposed that value-stereotype match determines the relationship between a particular value and antipathy toward a particular outgroup (Biernat, Vescio, & Theno, 1996; Biernat, Vescio, Theno, & Crandall, 1996; Vescio & Biernat, in press). To the extent that a stereotype of a group implies that a group violates that value, supporters of that value should be more prejudiced toward that group. According to this argument, and as noted by others (e.g., Katz & Hass, 1988), the reason PWE values predict prejudice toward Blacks is that stereotypes of Blacks reflect some violation of this value (e.g., "Blacks are lazy"). In addition, we expect PWE values to predict prejudice toward other groups that are stereotyped in PWE terms, e.g. homosexuals ("self-indulgent; unable to delay gratification"), and fat people ("lack will power"). Furthermore, the other core value we have discussed thus far--egalitarianism--should also function in a similar manner. Support for this value should predict prejudice toward groups perceived to violate this value by treating others unfairly because of their group membership (e.g., racist skin heads). Equally important for both of these values (and others) is the specificity and uniqueness of the predicted effects. The endorsement of a particular value should predict prejudice toward groups stereotyped as violating that value in some way, but should not predict attitudes toward groups that are stereotyped in a manner irrelevant to that value.

Note that this emphasis on value-stereotype match also suggests that values should predict *positive* attitudes toward groups stereotypically perceived as *supporting* those values. Thus, one might expect that PWE values would predict favorable attitudes toward stereotypically "hard-working" groups (e.g., medical students, business entrepreneurs). Although we have not directly tested this possibility, some research on the effects of a related political value--conservatism--is consistent with this perspective. Specifically, Lambert and Chasteen (1997) reasoned that because Blacks are viewed as unconventional but the elderly as conventional, conservatism should predict negative attitudes toward Blacks but positive attitudes toward the elderly. Two studies supported

this idea that conservative values push outgroup attitudes in a negative direction when the group is perceived to negate or defy the value, but in a positive direction when the group epitomizes the value.

Groups that support egalitarian values (e.g., civil rights workers) should also be positively perceived by those who endorse these values. Furthermore, groups perceived as disadvantaged or unfairly treated may also be favorably judged by egalitarians. Although the perception of a group's disadvantage is not quite the same as a perception that the group supports one's values, unfair treatment (and the need for sympathy and reparations) is highly *compatible* with humanitarian/egalitarian values. In this sense, the prediction that egalitarian values will predict positive attitudes toward groups perceived as unfairly treated is generally consistent with the our notion of value-stereotype match. Evidence supporting the prediction comes from the studies by Lambert and Chasteen (1997) described above. These researchers found that liberal political values (including some items designed to tap egalitarian values) predicted positive attitudes toward the elderly *and* Blacks, presumably because both of these groups are perceived as disadvantaged and deserving of sympathy and better treatment. The research described below was designed to further test some of the predictions derived from this broad perspective on how and why particular values are tied to prejudice toward particular groups.

Values and Prejudice Toward Outgroups: Some Correlational Data

To measure PWE and egalitarian value endorsement and address the initial question of whether these two values are critical to prejudice toward a variety of outgroups, we relied on Katz and Hass's (1988) instruments, in which PWE values are assessed with items such as "most people who don't succeed in life are just plain lazy," and "Humanitarian/Egalitarian (H/E) values with items such as "there should be equality for everyone because we are all human beings." Using a large sample of undergraduates at the University of Kansas, we measured these values, along with prejudice toward Blacks, homosexuals and overweight people (see Biernat, Vescio, Theno, & Crandall, 1996). Each of these groups are stereotyped as having shortcomings along PWE dimensions: Blacks are stereotyped as violating work ethic principles of motivation, and homosexuals and overweight people are perceived as being incapable of delaying gratification and controlling impulses (for homosexuals, the lack of control is based in sexuality; for fat people, in food). Therefore, endorsement of PWE values was expected to predict prejudice toward each group. At the same time, each group is perceived as culturally disadvantaged, and therefore endorsement of H/E values was expected to predict favorable group attitudes.

As can be seen in the first row of Table 1 (labeled "Model 1), both PWE and egalitarian value endorsement were significant predictors of each of the three types of prejudice. Support for PWE values was

associated with higher levels of anti-Black, anti-homosexual, and anti-fat attitudes, whereas support for H/E values was associated with lower levels of prejudice toward each of these three groups. The H/E correlations with prejudice tended to be stronger than those with PWE, a finding also discussed by Sears (1988). Importantly, these relationships held even when a measure of conservative politics (also a predictor of 2 of the 3 types of prejudice) was included in the regression equations (see row labeled "Model 2" in Table 1).

Table 1
Predictors of Prejudice

Model	Model R ² and Predictors	Prejudice Index		
		Modern racism	HATH	Anti-fat attitudes
Model 1:	R ²	.22	.17	.12
Values only	PWE	.23*	.25*	.16*
	Hum/Egal	-.46*	-.39*	-.34*
Model 2:	R ²	.26	.29	.12
+Conservative politics	PWE	.18*	.17*	.16*
	Hum/Egal	-.37*	-.27*	-.34*
	Conserv Pol	.23*	.37*	.02
Model 3:	R ²	.34	.40	.20
+In-Out group value support	PWE	.14*	.11*	.13*
	Hum/Egal	-.30*	-.23*	-.29*
	Conserv Pol	.19*	.31*	.01
	I-O Val Supp	.30*	.34*	.28*
Model 4:	R ²	.34	.40	.22
+Value for "World of Beauty"	PWE	.15*	.11*	.14*
	Hum/Egal	-.31*	-.23*	-.29*
	Conserv Pol	.20*	.31*	.01
	I-O Val Supp	.29*	.34*	.29*
	Val Beauty	.06	.01	.10*

Notes: Modern racism=Modern Racism Scale (McConabay, et al, 1981), HATH=Heterosexuals' Attitudes Toward Homosexuals (Larsen,et al., 1980), Anti-fat attitudes=Crandall's (1994) "Dislike" subscale of the anti-fat attitudes scale. N's range from 561–620; entries are standardized regression coefficients, * p < .05.

Table 1 also presents regression findings when still another variable was included in the equations: A measure of the extent to which

members of ingroups (i.e., Whites, heterosexuals, thin people) versus outgroups (Blacks, homosexuals, fat people) were perceived to support important values.² We examined this variable because of its importance in the theory of modern/symbolic racism (Kinder & Sears, 1981) as well as Rokeach's belief congruence model (Rokeach & Rothman, 1965; see more on this theory later in the chapter). As the "Model 3" row of Table 1 indicates, the perceived ingroup-outgroup difference in value support was a reliable predictor of prejudice above and beyond the effects of PWE values, H/E values, and conservative politics. To the extent that one's ingroup was perceived as more value supporting than an outgroup, prejudice toward that outgroup increased.³

Finally, these correlational data also allowed us to begin examining the question of whether values other than PWE and H/E matter for understanding outgroup prejudice. In our correlational studies, we had access to one other value measure that allowed us to test this notion: the importance people placed on "a world of beauty," one of Rokeach's terminal values. We assumed that this value was relevant to stereotypes of only one of our three outgroups--fat people--but not to the others: Fat people (but not Blacks or homosexuals) are often perceived as aesthetically displeasing (Allon, 1982). As Table 1 indicates (see row labeled "Model 4"), the extent to which respondents valued a world of beauty was reliably associated with anti-fat attitudes (but not anti-Black or anti-homosexual attitudes), even above and beyond the impact of the other predictors. This finding is not overwhelming, but it does provide some initial support for our thesis about the specificity of the value-stereotype match-prejudice link.

The data described in Table 1 are limited by their correlational nature, and they focus solely on prejudice toward groups as a whole. We were also interested in examining the role of values in an experimental context, focusing on two questions. First, how might values might affect prejudice expressed toward *individual members* of stereotyped groups? Second, are perceptions that an outgroup individual is disadvantaged due to situational factors beyond his/her control likely to arouse sympathetic reactions to the target and egalitarian values that, in turn, might generalize to more favorable attitudes toward the group to which that individual belongs?

Experimental Data

Values and Reactions to Outgroup Individuals

To address the impact of values on perceptions and evaluations of individual group members, we conducted a series of studies inspired by the theory and methods of Rokeach's "belief congruence" model (Rokeach & Mezei, 1966; Rokeach & Rothman, 1965). Rokeach was a consistency theorist, and part of his belief congruence principle stated that: "We tend to value people in proportion to the degree to which they exhibit beliefs . . . congruent with our own," (Rokeach, 1972, p. 83). By

extension, Rokeach suggested that prejudice may derive from the assumption that outgroup members hold beliefs (including values) contrary to our own, but that this prejudice should dissipate with the knowledge that these individuals actually shared our beliefs and belief systems.

To examine this possibility, Rokeach and his colleagues pitted ethnicity information against belief similarity information, and generally found similarity to play the larger role in evaluations of target individuals. For example, in both questionnaire and field studies, Rokeach (1972) found that Whites preferred to have coffee with Blacks with beliefs similar to their own (e.g., Blacks who agreed with them on the invasion of Cuba, or on allowing women to visit men's dormitories) over Whites with dissimilar beliefs. Similarly, "Negro who believes in God" was judged similarly to "white person who believes in God" and much more favorably than "white person who is an atheist" (Rokeach, Smith, & Evans, 1960).⁴

Analogously, in our studies, participants were exposed to ingroup and outgroup targets who did and did not violate important values (PWE values in studies on race; "family values" in a study on homosexuality). Thus, our work provided the grounds for replicating Rokeach's findings that belief congruence (in this case, value support) matters more than ingroup status for predicting evaluations of the target. More importantly, our research extended the studies of Rokeach and colleagues in several ways. First, we also examined the influence of individual differences in support for the relevant values. It should be the case that deviation from values—whether perceived or real—will be particularly striking for those who support the values most strongly (see also McConahay & Hough, 1976).

Second, we included priming manipulations designed to make different values salient in the experimental setting. Arguing that values are part of an associative network, Feather (1990) suggests that values will be more readily activated in a judgment context if the values are strong and "if there are cues in the situation that trigger them off" (p. 184). Thus, for values to be implicated in judgments of individual targets, they may need to be made situationally salient or prominent. Under these conditions, value-relevant cues (the outgroup membership of the target, his or her violation of the value) may provide the basis for judgment and evaluation (outgroup members and/or value violators disliked relative to ingroup members and/or value supporters).

Third, we additionally tested our hypothesis that group stereotypes should determine which values are relevant to a particular outgroup. As indicated earlier, certain aspects of homosexual stereotypes are relevant to PWE values and thus this value may predict prejudice toward homosexuals as a group. Nonetheless, the component of PWE that focuses on laziness on the job (the feature manipulated in our studies) is

relevant to stereotypes of Blacks, but not homosexuals. Therefore, PWE should play an important role in reactions to Black individuals but not homosexual individuals when the context is a work environment. In the case of homosexuals, however, other values or value systems may be more relevant, such as "family values," the focus of the second study to be described below.

In sum, we predicted that individual members of a group perceived to violate a relevant value will be judged more negatively than members of the non-violating group when a) judges strongly endorse the value themselves, and b) situational cues make that value salient. Furthermore, we explored the possibility that the combination of (a) and (b) is critical – that one must strongly endorse a relevant value *and* be primed to think of it for antipathy to be expressed. Direct evidence that a group member violates the value (conveyed through individuating information) may exacerbate this tendency as well.

Values and race-based judgment. In an initial study on race, undergraduate participants who were either high or low in PWE values were asked to evaluate a mail-room employee whose resumé, work record, and attached photograph depicted him as Black or White, and as being a dependable (PWE value-supporting) or lazy (PWE value-violating) employee. In addition to these manipulations, we also primed either PWE or H/E values by exposing participants to a tape-recorded speech that emphasized the importance of the relevant value prior to the employee evaluation phase of the study (see Biernat, Vescio, & Theno, 1996, Study 2, for details).

We found support for Rokeach's basic belief congruence principle on evaluative trait ratings (perceived competence, kindness, intelligence, etc.). The value violation of the employee strongly influenced the evaluations he received, such that the lazy employee was viewed much less favorably than the dependable employee. The race main effect was much smaller, and indicated more general favorability toward the Black than the White employee. More importantly, there was also evidence that individuals high and low in PWE values and primed with PWE or H/E values responded differently to Black and White employees.

The interaction among value endorsement, value prime and target race is presented in Figure 1. Among those who strongly endorsed PWE values, being primed to think of PWE values led to anti-Black bias, but being primed to think of H/E values produced equivalent ratings of Black and White targets. A mirror-image pattern emerged for those who strongly endorsed H/E values: Priming PWE values had no differential effect on evaluations of Blacks and Whites, but the H/E prime led to more favorable evaluations of the Black than the White employee. Strongly endorsing a value *and* being primed to think of that value produced differential evaluation based on race, in the direction of the relevant value (PWE=anti-Black, H/E=pro-Black; see Katz & Hass,

1988).

To examine the importance of value-stereotype match, we simultaneously ran a version of this study in which we altered the group membership of the target employee: he was described as either heterosexual or homosexual. Unlike stereotypes of Blacks, stereotypes of homosexuals do not implicate on-the-job laziness. Thus, we expected the value-irrelevant group membership of the target to be ignored in this case. Consistent with this prediction, the only effect to emerge was that the lazy worker was perceived less favorably than the dependable worker. Endorsing PWE values and/or being primed to think of them did *not* heighten participants' sensitivity to sexual orientation as a basis for judgment.





Figure 1. Evaluations of Black versus White "employees" based on individuals differences in values and priming condition (from Biernat, Vescio, & Theno, 1996).

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Endorsing PWE values and/or being primed to think of them did *not* heighten participants' sensitivity to sexual orientation as a basis for judgment.

Additional race studies in our lab have also supported the connection between PWE and H/E values and the differential evaluation of Black and White individuals. In one such study, we manipulated value salience more subtly, by simply asking participants to complete either the PWE or H/E value scales (Katz & Hass, 1988) prior to reading a brief description of a laid off Black or White employee (always a single male). The employee was also described as either dependable (PWE-value supporting) or lazy (PWE value-violating) and the key dependent variable was an estimate of the amount of government assistance the laid-off worker should receive (see Sniderman, Piazza, Tetlock, and Kendrick, 1991).

Along with a strong tendency to offer more government assistance to the dependable than the lazy laid off-worker, these data also revealed that the combination of strong value salience and strong support for the value made participants sensitive to the laid-off workers' race. As Figure 2 indicates, among those who completed the PWE scale, the low and high PWE valuers responded quite differently to the targets: High PWE valuers judged the laid-off White worker as more deserving of government assistance than the laid-off Black worker, while low PWE valuers showed the converse pattern. Among those who completed the H/E scale, those who highly endorsed this value judged the Black worker more worthy of assistance than the White worker, while low H/E valuers showed a (nonsignificant) reversal of this pattern. Again, the situational priming of a strongly endorsed value moved participants' reactions to targets' race in the predicted direction: High egalitarians were pro-Black, high PWE valuers were pro-White.⁵



In general, the race studies demonstrate that PWE and egalitarian values are associated with prejudice toward individual Black and White targets in the manner predicted by many modern theories of racism. Furthermore, our data suggest that it is the situational activation of these values in combination with strong support for the values that leads to Whites being favored over Blacks (in the case of PWE values), or Blacks being favored over Whites (in the case of Egalitarian values).

Values and judgments of homosexuals. Thus far, we have described research demonstrating that PWE and H/E values predict attitudes toward homosexuals as a group, but that in the context of evaluating individual lazy or dependable employees, these values have little impact (presumably because no stereotype depicts homosexuals as lazy workers). This does not, however, mean that values play no role in anti-gay sentiment.

Stereotypically, gay men and lesbian women are perceived as being incapable of having committed relations, corrupters of children, bad parents (or lacking parental instincts), anti-family, and possessing opposite- or cross-gender attributes (Deaux & Kite, 1987; Haddock & Zanna, 1998; Haddock, Zanna, & Esses, 1993; Herek, 1984, 1988; Kite, 1994; McLeod & Crawford, 1998; Simon, 1998). In short, these stereotypes suggest that homosexuals violate "family values," and anti-gay sentiment may derive from this perception. A few studies have examined the relationship between family values and anti-gay attitudes (Haddock et al., 1993; Herek, 1988; Herek & Capitanio, 1998), but to the best of our knowledge our study was the first to examine the causal role of family

values in judgments of individual gay men.

Using a design analogous to that used in the race studies, we examined the effect of individual differences in family value endorsement, situational value primes, target group membership and value relevant individuating behaviors (good or bad parenting), on reactions to gay male individuals (for a full description see Vescio & Biernat, in press). We measured support for family values using a single item from Rokeach's (1973) list of terminal values: Family security. Participants who ranked this value in their top 7 (of 18) were classified as high family-valuers, and those who ranked it in positions 8-18 were classified as low family-valuers. All participants were given a mock-up of the front page of a newspaper and were asked to read the cover story about "Billy," a latch key child. This story introduced the target of interest--Billy's homosexual or heterosexual father--who was depicted as being a good or a bad parent (e.g., "good dad" called Billy from work, made him a snack, and sent him to grandma for care; "bad dad" left Billy alone after school, forgot to feed him, etc.). Finally, the manipulation of situational value salience was accomplished by altering a photograph on the front page of the newspaper, which referred to a story that presumably appeared on a later page in the paper. In one version of the newspaper designed to prime family values, the photo depicted a smiling mother and father and their four children, with the caption "Happy family gatherings." In the control or neutral prime condition, the photo depicted a flower garden, with the caption "Spring flowers in bloom."

Not surprisingly, good fathers were evaluated much more favorably than bad fathers (supporting a belief congruence perspective), but values and the target's sexual orientation also mattered as well. Either highly valuing family security *or* being primed to think of family values produced devaluation of the heterosexual relative to the homosexual target. These effects are depicted in Figure 3. Low family valuers did not differentiate between the homosexual and heterosexual fathers, but high family valuers did. Similarly, those primed with the flower photo did not differentially evaluate the homosexual and heterosexual fathers, but those primed with the family photo did. This pattern is slightly different from our findings in the employee evaluation (race) study, where the *combination* of high values and primes produced sensitization to race as a cue to judgment. Here, *either* the individual difference measure or situational factor produced sensitization to sexual orientation. We suspect that this may be due to the stronger connection between family values and anti-gay sentiment than between PWE values and anti-Black sentiment, but at this point, we have no direct evidence to support this claim.




Figure 3. Interactions between endorsement of family values and sexual orientation, and value prime and sexual orientation, on evaluations of Billy's father.

Furthermore, one other piece of evidence from this study did suggest that the combination of chronic and temporary value support may matter for predicting evaluation of gay targets. After participants evaluated the father, we asked them to imagine that the dad lost custody of Billy and to indicate how they would feel about this state of affairs. Analysis of an index of "sympathetic" emotions" produced a reliable four-way interaction. Usually, interactions of this level are highly complex affairs, but in this case, the interaction boiled down to one key finding: Sympathy was high for the dad who lost custody *except* when high family values who were primed to think of family values considered the homosexual, value-violating father. Perhaps because custody loss is such an extreme event (especially in this case, where the father was the only living parent), it took many forces to warrant a loss of sympathy for the parent involved.

In any case, the findings in this study broaden and extend our race research by documenting that a value other than PWE or Egalitarianism—support for “family security”—is implicated in reactions toward members of a group stereotyped as deficient on this value: gay men. The focus on values may provide an important link between the study of racial and “sexual” prejudice (Herek, 2000), as well as prejudice toward other groups.

Values and Prejudice Reduction

While much of our discussion has been focused on the point that

values predict prejudice toward outgroups when there is high value-stereotype match, our correlational data and the race studies also consistently found that egalitarian values were associated with more favorable intergroup attitudes. Elsewhere we have suggested that egalitarian values may best be conceptualized as a general prejudice antidote (Biernat, Vescio, & Theno, 1996; Biernat, Vescio, et al., 1996). More specifically, Vescio, Sechrist & Paolucci (2003) suggested that egalitarian values should motivate improved intergroup attitudes *when outgroups or individual members of outgroups are perceived as being unfairly treated*. One implication of this suggestion is that manipulations that increase perceptions that an individual is treated unfairly as a result of his or her group membership should arouse egalitarian values. This raises the question of whether enhanced endorsement of egalitarian values might in turn produce more favorable attitudes toward the entire group to which an individual belongs.

To examine this possibility, Vescio et al. (2003) used a perspective-taking paradigm (see Batson, Polycarpou, Harmon-Jones, Imhoff, et al., 1997). White participants were presented with a simulated interview segment in which a Black student discussed some of the group-related difficulties he faced adjusting to college at a predominantly White university (e.g., professors reiterating minor points as if he didn't understand, female friends becoming angry when approached for a date). Immediately prior to listening to the interview participants read "listening perspective" instructions. Half of the participants were encouraged to attend to technical and professional aspects of the interview segment, taking "an objective perspective toward what is described," while not getting "caught up in how the man who is interviewed feels about the difficulties he describes." The other half of the participants were encouraged to adopt the interviewee's perspective. They were asked to "try to imagine how the man who is interviewed feels about the difficulties he describes" and to "try to feel the full impact of the experiences this man has had and how he feels as a result."

In line with past research, Vescio et al. (2003) expected that encouraging people to adopt the perspective of an individual who has faced difficulties as a result of group membership would lead to more sympathetic reactions to the target and improved intergroup attitudes (see Batson et al., 1997; Vescio, Hewstone, & Paolucci, 2004). Additionally, perspective taking was expected to increase perceptions that the problems faced by the individual were beyond his control—specifically, that they were caused by situational rather than dispositional factors, and to increase endorsement of egalitarian values. The arousal of egalitarian values should then mediate the relationship between perspective taking and improved intergroup attitudes.

Consistent with these predictions, perspective taking influenced empathy, attributions, and intergroup attitudes. Whites who adopted the

perspective of a Black student were more empathic, made more situational attributions, and expressed more pro-Black attitudes (measured an hour after listening to the stimulus interview), compared to those who were encouraged to remain objective observers. In addition, perspective taking influenced endorsement of egalitarian values, but not PWE values (as measured by the scales of Katz & Hass, 1988). Importantly, when pro-Black attitudes were regressed on perspective taking, egalitarian values, empathy, and situational attributions, the relationship between perspective taking and pro-black attitudes was reduced to nearly zero ($\beta=.06$) compared to a model where perspective taking was the only predictor, $\beta=.30, p<.02$. In the multiple regression equation, egalitarian value endorsement was also the only predictor to account for significant variance in pro-black attitudes ($\beta=.33, p<.0007$ versus empathy: $\beta=.19, p>.10$; situational attributions: $\beta=.23, p<.07$). In short, egalitarian values may be heightened by exposure to the unfair treatment faced by outgroup members, and may play a key role in reducing prejudice toward individual members of outgroups and outgroups as a whole.

Conclusions: What do we know and where do we go from here?

Our goal in this chapter was to elaborate the variety of ways in which values predict intergroup attitudes. Our findings point to several important conclusions in this regard. First, PWE and Egalitarian values predict attitudes toward a number of outgroups (Blacks, homosexuals, fat people), such that PWE values promote and Egalitarian values thwart the expression of prejudice. Although these two values feature prominently in theories of racism, they seem to matter for a variety of other "-isms" as well, perhaps because of their centrality in American ideology (Myrdal, 1944).

Whether these values can be expected to influence attitudes toward particular outgroups depends on stereotypes. For example, to the degree that the stereotype of any group implies that group members have shortcomings along PWE dimensions, PWE values should motivate negative attitudes. And though not explicitly tested here, to the degree that group stereotypes imply shortcomings along the humanitarian/egalitarian dimension, Egalitarian values should also motivate negative attitudes (thus, high egalitarians should be particularly disdainful of skinheads, sexists, etc.). Testing this latter prediction will be important, as supportive findings would suggest that egalitarianism does not lead to indiscriminate liking, but in fact to *disliking* of those who explicitly violate egalitarian values.

Second, our research suggests that values other than PWE and Egalitarianism are related to intergroup attitudes as well. Which values matter and when is determined by value-stereotype match. If a group is stereotyped as violating particular values--aesthetic values in the case of

fat people; family values in the case of gay men (in addition to PWE values in the case of Black Americans)--individuals who support those values will dislike the group and its individual members. It is worth noting that Rokeach himself defined stereotypes in terms of values (Rokeach, 1972): When one holds a stereotype "the attitude object is said to prefer certain modes of conduct which are judged to be socially desirable or undesirable (for example, 'Negroes are lazy,' implying of course, that Negroes possess a value not shared by the person doing the stereotyping)" (pp. 125-126). Our suggestion that the values implicated in prejudice depend on group stereotypes is quite consistent with this description.

Third, some of our findings can also be viewed in terms of another form of value-stereotype match. Specifically, groups that are stereotyped as *supporting* a given value, or being compatible with that value, should be evaluated *favorably* by those who endorse the value. The negative correlations between H/E values and prejudice toward Blacks, homosexuals, and fat people are consistent with this idea, in that these groups are historically disadvantaged and unfairly treated--attributes compatible with H/E values. A fuller test of the prediction would require demonstrating that PWE values predict positive attitudes toward groups that explicitly support PWE values (or that family values predict positive attitudes toward those that explicitly support family values, etc.) Our finding from the employee evaluation studies that those who supported PWE values and were primed to think of them showed bias in favor of *Whites* is intriguing in this regard, but without explicit evidence that Whites are stereotyped as PWE supporters, the findings are only suggestive. Nonetheless, Lambert and Chasteen's (1997) study of elderly and Black attitudes do seem to indicate that values predict favorable attitudes toward those groups perceived as endorsing, or embodying, those values.

A fourth conclusion that can be drawn from our research is that situational factors that heighten the salience of a particular value may extremize the influence of values. Most people support many values at once, and most would agree that many of the values that appear in value inventories are worth supporting. This is one reason why Rokeach thought it important to consider the priority *rankings* assigned to a series of values ("life is ipsative," Rokeach, 1985, p. 162), and why Schwartz (1992; 1996) also favors consideration of value hierarchies and systems rather than single values in isolation. Furthermore, two or more values a person holds dear may conflict with one another (Tetlock, 1986; Tetlock, Peterson, & Lerner, 1996). As Rokeach (1968) wrote, ". . . in a given situation a person may have to choose between such terminal values as self-fulfillment and prestige, between salvation and a comfortable life" (p. 161).

It is for these reasons that the context or situation is important for

determining the influence of values on attitudes and behaviors (see similar arguments in the social cognition literature more generally; e.g., Higgins & Bargh, 1987). The context cues the relevance of one of many endorsed values, which are most important for the matter at hand. Thus, in our studies, most participants supported egalitarian, individualistic, and family values to some extent, but whether these values predicted prejudice depended on situational primes—a blatant speech endorsing a value, filling out a questionnaire that required one to think about a value, or simply seeing a photo that represented the value. The combination of an accessible value and a value-relevant target affected evaluations in predictable ways (PWE values led to relative devaluation of Blacks, egalitarian values to valuation of Blacks, and family values to devaluation of homosexual targets—especially those who also explicitly violated family values).

Important future questions include why values operate as they do. When are values used as justifiers of prejudice (Crandall & Eshleman, 2001; Kristiansen & Zanna, 1994) versus causes of prejudiced responding (as suggested by our work)? Similarly, what is it that situational primes of values do? Is their effect based purely on cognitive processes, or do primes instantiate motives that play out in expressed prejudice? The extent to which the effects we have described are driven by conscious versus nonconscious processes is also worthy of attention. Finally, what are the implications of our research for prejudice reduction?

A direct implication of Rokeach's belief congruence model is that prejudice would be reduced if individuals were convinced that outgroup members supported their values. However, this may be a tall order. Although one might easily come to believe that an individual group member supports one's values, it is unlikely that this positive perception will generalize to more favorable attitudes toward the entire group to which the individual belongs. This is because value supporting outgroup members are also likely to be atypical group members, and atypical group members tend to be subtyped, leaving initial intergroup attitudes and stereotypic perceptions in tact (e.g., Rothbart & John, 1985; see also Brewer & Miller, 1988; Maurer, Park & Rothbar, 1995). However, work presented here suggests the viability of an alternative value-based means of prejudice reduction.

Reminding people of certain values, especially egalitarian values, may reduce the expression of prejudice toward groups perceived as disadvantaged. The experiment on perspective-taking described earlier (Vescio et al., 2003) suggests that endorsement of egalitarian values will increase with the simple instruction to take the perspective of another who has experienced disadvantages because of group membership. These values, in turn, prompt more favorable outgroup attitudes (even to a greater extent than do empathy or situational attributions). While questions of the longevity of such effects have not been fully explored,

Vescio et al. (2003) measured attitudes an hour after their perspective taking manipulation, following an unrelated experiment and in a different context, suggesting that improved attitudes are not simply due to immediate situational salience of egalitarian values. Batson and his colleagues (1997) have also documented improved intergroup attitudes two weeks following minor perspective taking manipulations. Perhaps once a particular outgroup is deemed societally disadvantaged, links between egalitarian values and perceptions of that outgroup exist, providing the groundwork for improved intergroup attitudes.

Finally, we will close by reiterating some observations offered by Rokeach (1968) about the study of values. He suggested that social psychologists have focused too much on "attitudes" as our central, indispensable construct (Allport, 1935; Thomas & Znaniecki, 1918), and that instead, our focus should shift from theories of attitude organization and change toward more comprehensive theories of value organization and change. Rokeach offered several reasons: 1) values are more dynamic constructs than attitudes because they have a strong motivational component, 2) although both attitudes and values predict behavior, values determine attitudes as well, making them more central concepts, 3) given that there are fewer values than attitudes, the value concept provides a "more economical analytical tool for describing and explaining similarities and differences between persons, groups, nations, and cultures" (Rokeach, 1968, pp. 157-158), and 4) the value concept is more cross-disciplinary, being of concern not just to psychologists and sociologists but to anthropologists, philosophers, economists, and political scientists, among others. Although we have highlighted the role of values in understanding prejudice, the value concept has broader theoretical value as well.

Footnotes

[1] The term "fat people" is not meant to be pejorative, but rather provides a descriptive label that avoids the assumption of a medical condition (e.g., obesity) or comparison to a standard (e.g., overweight). Furthermore, the adjective "fat" is used by an important activist organization, the National Association to Advance Fat Acceptance.

[1] The labels ingroup and outgroup are accurate descriptors for most, but not all, of our participants. That is, most of our respondents were White and (we assume) heterosexual and of normal weight, though the latter two demographics were not directly assessed. We retain the labels for convenience while recognizing that there is some error in these classifications. Alternative labels might include "dominant group" and "stigmatized group," though we believe the dynamics of perceived value support are driven more directly by ingroup/outgroup status.

[1] Other researchers have also noted that perceived "value threats" predict prejudice toward outgroups, including homosexuals (Haddock, Zanna, & Esses,

1993), and Mexican immigrants (Stephan & Stephan, 1996).

[1] Others have argued against the strong version of Rokeach's belief congruence principle—that belief similarity trumps ethnic or other group categorization. For examples, see Insko, Nacoste, & Moe, 1983; Smith, Williams, & Willis, 1967; Stein, Hardyck, & Smith, 1965; and Triandis & Davis, 1965.

[5] The fact that rejection of the primed value was associated with reversals of this pattern can perhaps be explained in terms of reactance (Brehm & Brehm, 1981).

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